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Charles F. H a l l  (Pioneer Project Manager, Ames Research Center, NASA) 
Aubrey B. Mickelwait (Pioneer Program Director a t  TRW Systems) 
INTRODUCTION 
The development of a program f o r  s c i e n t i f i c  exploration of space i s  a 
complex undertaking. 
elements within the  program and cor re la tes  t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s  so that t h e  
object ives  of t h e  program a r e  m e t  within the  technical ,  f i s c a l ,  and schedule 
constraints .  A number of too ls ,  techniques, and procedures a r e  ava i lab le  t o  
the  systems-engineering group t o  achieve t h i s  purpose. Those appl ied i n  the 
development of the  Pioneer Program a r e  described i n  t h i s  paper. 
Systems engineering br ings together a l l  t h e  diverse 
The Pioneer Project  Office a t  the Ames Research Center, located approxi- 
mately 40 miles south of San Francisco, was responsible f o r  overa l l  management 
and systems engineering of t h e  Pioneer Program. TRW Systems i n  Los Angeles 
was t h e  prime contractor on t h e  Pioneer Program and was responsible f o r  the 
management and systems engineering associated with the  spacecraft  and mission 
dependent ground equipment. 
performed a t  Ames Research Center and TRW Systems a r e  discussed i n  t h e  present 
paper. 
The systems engineering aspects  of the  work 
The Pioneer mission object ives  a r e  summarized as follows: 
(a) W h a t :  Systematic measurement of magnetic f i e l d s ,  plasma, high 
(b) When: From minimum t o  maximum solar  a c t i v i t y .  
(c)  
(d) How: h u n c h  f i v e  Pioneer spacecraft .  
energy p a r t i c l e s ,  and dust i n  interplanetary space. 
Where: A t  large azimuthal distances from m r t h  between 0.8 and 
1 .2  AU (Astronomical Unit) from t h e  Sun. 
It i s  an t ic ipa ted  that the  systematic measurements w i l l  provide a b e t t e r  
understanding of how s o l a r  disturbances a r e  propagated through space, of the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p  of such disturbances t o  t e r r e s t i a l  phenomena, and the  re la t ion-  
ship between s o l a r  and g a l a c t i c  f i e l d s .  
was se lec ted  because these interplanetary phenomena a r e  a f f e c t e d  s t rongly by 
t h e  magnitude of the  s o l a r  disturbances. The observations are made a t  la rge  
azimuthal dis tances  from the  Earth t o  inves t iga te  t h e  spatial e f f e c t s .  
implement these objectives,  f i v e  f l i g h t s  are t o  be launched a t  i n t e r v a l s  of 
approximately 8 t o  12 months, two of which w i l l  move ahead of the  B r t h  with 
increasing time, and three  of which w i l l  move behind the Earth with increasing 
t i m e .  
those f o r  t h e  l a t t e r  l i e  between 1.0 and 1.2 AU from t h e  Sun. 
The time f o r  making the  measurements 
To 
The t r a j e c t o r i e s  f o r  the  former l i e  between 0.8 and 1.0 AU from the Sun; 
To date, a Pioneer spacecraft  has been launched i n  each of the  above 
d i rec t ions .  
launched on August 17, 1966. To t h e  present,  none of the spacecraft  equipment 
or s c i e n t i f i c  instruments have experienced any malfunction which would prevent 
achieving the  aforementioned s c i e n t i f i c  objectives.  It i s  estimated that 
during t h e  t o t a l  of almost 1,000 days of operation, more than 5 x 109 b i t s  
of s c i e n t i f i c  data have been received by the ground s t a t i o n s  and 12,000 
c o m n d s  have been transmitted t o  the spacecraft .  
The first was launched on December 16, 1965, and the  second was 
ORGANIZATION 
The organization of the systems-engineering group has a major e f f e c t  on 
i t s  a b i l i t y  t o  f u l f i l l  i t s  o b l i e t i o n s  and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .  
of t h e  Pioneer Project  Office i s  shown i n  Figure 1. 
t h e  of f ice  with s p e c i f i c  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  the seven ex terna l  subsystem 
elements and four  u n i t s  with respons ib i l i ty  f o r  one function. Each u n i t  i s  
between 4 and 10 persons, depending on t h e  complexity of t h e  funct ion of the  
group. (a) t o  be 
thoroughly famil iar  w i t h  the  a c t i v i t i e s  and p e r f o m n c e  of' i t s  associated 
element; (b)  t o  be knowledgeable about future  plans of t h e  element; and ( c )  
t o  keep other u n i t s  f u l l y  informed about a c t i v i t i e s  of i t s  ex terna l  element 
which m y  a f f e c t  them. 
example, a t  t h e  start of design and development, the Delta launch vehicle  was 
capable of boosting only 95 pounds t o  the  ve loc i ty  required by t h e  Pioneer 
mission objectives.  
System Unit of planned improvements, i t  was possible t o  specify a t o t a l  
allowable weight of 130 pounds t o  t h e  spacecraft  and instrument elements a t  
that t i m e .  
The organization 
There a r e  s i x  u n i t s  within 
The broad r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  of each subsystem u n i t  a r e :  
The second respons ib i l i ty  i s  very important. For 
However, because gf an  awareness by t h e  Iaunch-Vehicle- 
The organization of the Pioneer Program Office a t  TRW was very similar 
t o  that a t  Ames Research Center although it perhaps placed l e s s  emphasis on 
the Instrument, Launch Vehicle, and Data Handling Systems and more on the  
Spacecraft  and Ground Operational Equipment than the Ames organization. 
CONTRACT 
The contract  i s  valuable t o  t h e  systems group i n  dealing w i t h  the pr inc ipa l  
external  un i t s .  If properly wri t ten,  t h e  contract  can motivate the external  
u n i t  t o  achieve t h e  desired technical  performance. 
Systems was a multiple-incentive type. Figure 2 shows the items for which the 
incent ives  were offered, namely, performance, schedule, and cost .  The d o l l a r  
value shown f o r  each of the  incent ives  i s  t h e  mximum award or penalty cor- 
responding to  t h e  indicated var ia t ion  of the  parameter. The var ia t ion  within 
these l i m i t s  was not l i n e a r ,  Except f o r  the  weight and schedule, the  incent ives  
a r e  f o r  four  spacecraft .  
spacecraft  only. Incentives for the  f i f t h  spacecraft  have not yet  been 
negotiated. 
The contract  w i t h  TRW 
Weight and schedule incent ives  were for the  f irst  
Incentive awards were offered for t h e  four  technica l  .performance f a c t o r s  
t h a t  were considered of prime importance t o  t h e  achievement of the  mission. 
TRW personnel were highly motivated by these incent ives .  
received the maximum performance incent ive award on both Pioneer V I  and VII. 
To date,  TRW has 
Incentives are not a panacea and used indiscr iminately can open a 
Fandora's box. 
incentives w i l l  produce resul ts  desirable  t o  t h e  program as a whole and llot 
j u s t  t o  an individual  contractor .  Incentives f o r  several  Pioneer subcontracts 
f o r  the  s c i e n t i f i c  instruments were se lec ted  by the  experimenter independently 
of the systems group. 
formance and cost ;  a n  incent ive f o r  schedule vas neglected. The subcontractor 
tends, therefore, t o  minimize cost  and maximize performance w i t h  no thought of 
schedule. Yet a delay i n  del ivery of a subsystem can cause a cost  increase t o  
the  program l a r g e r  than t h e  savings from t h e  contract  or more than the p e r -  
formance improvement i s  worth. 
-2- 
It i s  e s s e n t i a l  that the  systems group make c e r t a i n  t h a t  the 
I n  those cases, incent ives  were appl ied  only t o  per- 
I 
DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT PHASE - STUDY AND SPACECRAFT DESCRIPTION 
The various aspects  of systems engineering assoc ia ted  w i t h  the technica l  
aspects  of the  program w i l l  be examined next. The f i rs t  phase i s  design and 
development. During t h i s  phase, t h e  e n t i r e  program i s  shaped; sound decisions 
and d i rec t ion  can favorably a f f e c t  a l l  subsequent a c t i v i t i e s ;  whereas unsound 
decisions, misdirection, or, more l ike ly ,  no direct ion,  can adversely a f f e c t  
such a c t i v i t i e s .  
The cons t ra in ts  f o r  Pioneer were the  performance of t h e  launch vehicle  
and the s ize  of the f a i r i n g  which l i m i t  the  s i z e  and weight of the spacecraft  
and, i n  turn,  severely l i m i t  a l l  spacecraft subsystems and s c i e n t i f i c  i n s t r u -  
ment s . 
The design requirements f o r  Pioneer were that it provide: 
1. A s t a b l e  platform f o r  t h e  instruments 
2. A 360" scan i n  the e c l i p t i c  plane 
3. 
4. 
5. A data system a b l e  t o  sample and transmit s c i e n t i f i c  and engineering 
An induced magnetic f i e l d  l e s s  than 1 y (gamma) a t  the magnetometer 
Operation i n  space f o r  more than s i x  months 
measurements t o  Earth from large dis tances  a t  b i t  r a t e s  as high as 
512 b i t s  per  second 
A command system t o  permit ground control  of about 57 operational 
modes 
6. 
7. A su i tab le  thermal environment f o r  the  instrumentation 
Before project  approval, a design study - a power t o o l  of systems 
engineering - was m d e  by TRW Systems. It i s  important that such s tudies  be 
made s u f f i c i e n t l y  e a r l y  so t h a t  they are not subject t o  heavy pressures. Such 
pressures occur l a t e r  i n  the  program primarily because a la rge  number of people 
await t h e  solut ion of technical  problems or because l a r g e  cos ts  a r e  associated 
with changes. 
be important. 
During the  design study, only the meri ts  of each option should 
The Pioneer spacecraft  w i l l  be described t o  ind ica te  some of the b a s i c  
concepts obtained from the  study. 
design and development phase, these basic  concepts remined  unchanged. 
Although changes were necessary during the 
Figure 3 i s  a photograph of t h e  spacecraft ,  and Figure 4 shows the  space- 
c r a f t  i n  the launch and f l i g h t  configurations. The spacecraft  i s  cy l indr ica l  
and has three radial  booms, an antenna mst on the cylinder a x i s  a t  t h e  forward 
end, and an  antenna system f o r  one s c i e n t i f i c  instrument a t  the a f t  end. The 
curved surface of the  cylinder,  except f o r  a small band provided f o r  viewing 
by the instruments, i s  covered w i t h  solar c e l l s  t o  supply the  on-board power. 
Within t h e  cylinder i s  a s ingle  platform on which a l l  the  e lec t ronic  equipment 
f o r  t h e  spacecraft  and s i x  or seven sch ien t i f ic  instruments are located. 
Thermal louvers a f t  of the  equipment platform cover a portion of the platform 
a r e a  and open or close automatically t o  control  the  heat radiated from that 
surface.  
The most important conclusion of the design study was that t h e  space- 
c r a f t  should be s t a b i l i z e d  by spinning. (The nominal spin rate was 60 rpm.) 
The requirements f o r  a s tab le  platform and scanning were thus met without 
incurr ing any weight penalty. A spin a x i s  perpendicular t o  t h e  plane of the 
e c l i p t i c  fur ther  s a t i s f i e s  the scanning requirement f o r  most of t h e  mission. 
A cold nitrogen gas system i s  used t o  achieve t h i s  or ien ta t ion  within several  
days af ter  launch. The three booms a r e  required t o  augment the spacecraft  
moment of i n e r t i a  about the  spin a x i s  t o  achieve the s t a b i l i z a t i o n .  One boom 
has a nozzle which, as p a r t  of the  gas system, provides t h e  torque f o r  a t t i t u d e  
control,  and a second boom has a wobble damper a t  i t s  end. 
contains the magnetometer sensor. 
mast and the experiment antenna i s  folded aga ins t  the cylinder during the 
powered f l i g h t  so as t o  f i t  within the  launch vehicle  f a i r i n g .  
a f t e r  t h e  spacecraft separates from the launch vehicle,  the  booms and experi- 
ment antenna a r e  deployed automatically. 
The t h i r d  boom 
The booms are folded aga ins t  the antenna. 
Immediately 
* 
A second important funct ion of the  booms i s  t o  allow the magnetometer a t  
the end of one boom t o  be as far as possible  from spacecraft  equipment that 
induces magnetic f i e l d s .  
a low induced f i e l d  s t rength a t  the magnetometer is ,  therefore ,  eased. 
theless ,  it was s t i l l  necessary t o  s e l e c t  the mater ia ls  and p a r t s  carefu l ly  
f o r  t h e  e n t i r e  spacecraft ,  and t o  use magnetic-compensation design techniques 
t o  s a t i s f y  t h i s  requirement f u l l y .  
The problem of sa t i s fy ing  the  design requirement f o r  
Never- 
The problem of communicating with t h e  Earth from a spinning spacecraft  
a t  la rge  distances was solved by using a high-gain antenna w i t h  a disk- l ike 
p a t t e r n  i n  a plane perpendicular t o  the spin a x i s .  
spin a x i s  i s  perpendicular t o  the e c l i p t i c  plane, the rad ia t ion  from the  
antenna continuously i l luminates  the  Earth. Since there  i s  a s igni f icant  
reduction i n  the s igna l  s t rength received a t  t h e  ground w i t h  movement of t he  
spin a x i s  away from a perpendicular t o  t h e  Earth-spacecraft l i n e ,  the antenna 
gain pa t te rn  permits detection of spacecraft  misorientation and i s  used i n  
s e t t i n g  the desired or ien ta t ion  by ground command. 
i s  measured by inherent proper t ies  of a communication system selected f o r  
communication a t  la rge  distance.  
Hence when the spacecraft  
Thus spacecraft  a t t i t u d e  
TO achieve t h e  l i f e t i m e  requirement, operation i n  space f o r  more than 
s i x  months, redundancy i s  used i n  a number of subsystems i n  t h e  spacecraft .  
The or ien ta t ion  e lec t ronics  i s  almost f u l l y  redundant w i t h  as much as four- 
f o l d  redundancy i n  some portions because of i t s  importance t o  the scanning 
requirement and i t s  influence on the  communication subsystem. 
a l s o  has redundant power converters, receivers ,  command decoders, and t rave l ing  
wave tube power amplif iers .  
r e d u n a n t .  Redundancy must be used judiciously s ince it increases  the space- 
c r a f t  weight. For Pioneer, t h i s  weight increase was approximately 13 pounds. 
The spacecraft  
A port ion of t h e  d i g i t a l  telemetry u n i t  i s  a l s o  
From t h e  overa l l  project  viewpoint, the  s t rength  of the  design study - 
conducted ear ly  by a small g r m p  working without the  pressures  t o  meet schedule, 
cost ,  or the urgencies of a complete program organization - a l s o  contributed 
t o  i t s  weakness. In the  Pioneer study t h e r e  was no a c t i v e  par t ic ipa t ion  by 
members of several  important system elements s ince the  program was not formally 
organized and some elements were not se lec ted  a t  that t i m e .  
completion o f  t h e  design study and the  start of d e t a i l e d  design, a number of 
changes were made i n  the systems. None of t h e  fundamental concepts were 
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Thus between the 
changed, bu t  refinements were made t o  take i n t o  account t h e  new information 
per ta ining t o  the  in te r fac ing  subsystems. 
SYSTEM ACTIVITIES DURING DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT PHASE 
Some of the more important a c t i v i t i e s  of the systems group during the  
design and development phase were: 
1. To prepare bas ic  specif icat ions 
2. To conduct coordination meetings 
3. To 'prepare in te r face  specif icat ions f o r  major elements 
4. 
5. To a t t e n d  design reviews 
6. 
7. To support smaller elements within t h e  program 
To approve .plans, procedures, and spec i f ica t ions  
To review the impact of subsystem design or design changes on overal l  
system 
I n  preparing the  bas ic  specif icat ions,  care was taken t o  assure  tha t  they 
covered a l l  t h e  bas ic  requirements (design, fabr ica t ion ,  t e s t ,  and handling) 
t o  meet t h e  mission objectives,  but that they did not prevent the designer 
from m k i n g  i n t e l l i g e n t  t rade-offs .  
During t h e  e a r l y  phases of design, several  coordination meetings were 
held. 
f o r  example, the experimenters and spacecraft  designer, or the  ground s t a t i o n  
engineers and the  ground s t a t i o n  equipment designer. The need f o r  coordination 
meetings i n  Pioneer-type spacecraft  which carry a number of s c i e n t i f i c  ins t ru-  
ments i s  grea t  and perhaps distinguishes such a program from others  i n  which 
the  object ives  are m e t  by a s ingle  type of equipment supplied b y  few sources. 
Ehch experimenter uses a d i f f e r e n t  instrument and h i s  requirements f requent ly  
c o n f l i c t  w i t h  those of the other  experimenters or spacecraft .  The purpose of 
t h e  coordination meetings was t o  review the  technical  requirements of the 
various experimenters,@the spacecraft  and the  in te r faces  between them. 
The Ames  systems group chaired such meetings and the  par t ic ipants  were, 
Meetings were held whenever a s igni f ica  d decision vas required. 
Information presented a t  the  coordination meetings was the b a s i s  f o r  the  
in te r face  specif icat ions.  
and revised as the  design of t h e  various subsystems proceeded. The in te r face  
spec i f ica t ions  were very detai led.  
systems group ensured the  conrpatibility of t h e  equipment supplied. 
taken that a l l  p o t e n t i a l  problem areas  were covered. For example, a poten t ia l  
problem on spacecraft  carrying a number of instruments i s  mutual interference,  
e i t h e r  conducted o r  radiated.  The in te r face  specif icat ion,  therefore ,  s t a t e d  
t h e  allowable frequencies that each assembly might generate s o  t h a t  it would 
not  be i n  the  range of s u s c e p t i b i l i t y  of another assembly. The information 
f o r  such a specif icat ion was developed during one of t h e  e a r l y  coordination 
meetings f o r  Pioneer, for tunately,  since the  i n i t i a l  survey indicated several  
p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of interference; the corrective ac t ions  were simple. In  t h i s  
case, t h e  compromises necessary t o  avoid the problem had no adverse e f f e c t  on 
t h e  operation of the subsystems. However, usual ly  the design choice f o r  
o v e r a l l  system improvement can hur t  one or more of the  subsystems. For 
Such specif icat ions were thus constantly reviewed 
They were the primary means by which the  
Care was 
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example, on Pioneer there  i s  a fuse i n  t h e  power lead t o  each s c i e n t i f i c  
instrument. The experimenters opposed t h i s  design arguing that fuses  were 
notoriously unre l iab le  and that a momentary overload that would have no l a s t i n g  
e f f e c t  on the equipment couldburn  out the  fuse and thus end t h e  operation Of * 
the instrument. These arguments had merit  from the  viewpoint of the individual  
experimenters; from the  systems viewpoint, t h e  fuse  was deemed necessary t o  
prevent a permanent overload i n  t h e  event of a short  c i r c u i t  i n  any ins t ru-  
ment. 
I 
Discussions i n  the coordination meetings a l s o  brought t o  l i g h t  .potent ia l  
For example, the 
problems which could necess i ta te  changes t o  the b a s i c  requirements; the systems 
group had t o  evaluate each and decide on the proper ac t ion .  
Deep Space Network/Spacecraft meetings indicated the a d v i s a b i l i t y  of providing 
f u l l  c m u n i c a t i o n  power f o r  i n i t i a l  acquis i t ion  and .providing a means f o r  
sampling and recording data during nontracking .periods. 
t i o n  was modified t o  incorporate these changes i n  the spacecraft .  
The b a s i c  specif ica-  
The systems group a l s o  evaluated plans,  procedures, specif icat ions,  and 
parts that each element was using t o  make c e r t a i n  that overa l l  requirements 
were met, 
The Pioneer systems groups spent considerable time reviewing designs, 
many as three design reviews were held f o r  each spacecraft  subsystem, each 
instrument, and each ground-equipment subsystem. 
made ava i lab le  f o r  study several  weeks i n  advance of a review. 
t h e  systems groups a t  both the Project  Office and TRW attended t h e  design 
reviews for each of t h e  spacecraft  and ground-equipment subsystems. Design 
engineers from a l l  subsystems having an  i n t e r f a c e  with the subsystem being 
reviewed par t ic ipated.  The meetings were formal, de ta i led  minutes were taken, 
and, most important, subjects  requir ing f u r t h e r  a c t i o n  were assigned, with a 
det'inite completion date,  t o  individuals.  Design reviews f o r  the  s c i e n t i f i c  
instruments were attended only by t h e  systems group from the Project Office.  
A s  
Documentation was usual ly  
Personnel from 
The importance of the  design review cannot be overstressed, f o r  here 
the  design engineers from the  in te r fac ing  subsystems exchanged background 
information and discussed the  various trade-offs leading t o  the selected 
design. It i s  the  b e s t  means of preventing f u t u r e  problems. I n  addi t ion,  
the  information presented was invaluable t o  t h e  systems group when it reviewed 
the  design of each program element s ince it was b e t t e r  prepared t o  evaluate 
options presented during the  review. The information obtained i n  the reviews 
was a l s o  of great  use i n  planning the f l i g h t  operations.  
A continuing a c t i v i t y  of the systems group was assessing t h e  impact of a 
subsystem design or design change on t h e  o v e r a l l  system and vice versa .  
example i s  the mutual e f f e c t s  between t h e  o r i e n t a t i o n  subsystem and the  
powered-flight t r a j e c t o r y .  Immediately following separation of t h e  spacecraft  
from t h e  launch vehicle, the  spacecraft  automatical ly  o r i e n t s  i t sel f  so  that 
the spin ax is ,  and hence solar c e l l  a r ray ,  are perpendicular t o  t h e  spacecraft-  
Sun l i n e .  The mneuver i s  control led by two Sun sensors;  t h e  sensors a r e  
opposite t o  one another on the spacecraft  "equator" with one scanning almost 
the  e n t i r e  upper hemisphere and the  second t h e  lower hemisphere. The sensors 
must be designed so as t o  have a b l ind  a r e a  wi th in  10' of t h e  spin a x i s  a t  
both ends t o  prevent an undamped or divergent o s c i l l a t i o n  of t h e  spin a x i s  if 
the spacecraft  i s  wobbling a t  separation and t h e  spin a x i s  i s  pointing near t o  
- 6- 
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. 
t h e  Sun. On the other hand, the  powered-flight t r a j e c t o r y  must now be shaped 
t o  preclude the  p o s s i b i l i t y  that t h e  sp in  a x i s  might point t o  within 10' of 
the Sun following separation and ne i ther  sensor would see the Sun so as t o  
i n i t i a t e  the  maneuver. A considerable e f f o r t  was expended by t h e  systems 
group, first i n  determining t h e  seriousness of the p o t e n t i a l  problems, and 
then assuring i t s e l f  t h a t  a solut ion was possible.  The systems group must 
be continuously on the  a l e r t  t o  detect  these p o t e n t i a l  problem areas .  
Problems such as t h i s  example can be e a s i l y  overlooked, or t h e i r  assessment 
neglected, because of t h e i r  apparent t r i v i a l i t y ;  yet  they can have a s ig-  
n i f ican t  e f f e c t  on the  mission. 
I n  t h e  Pioneer Program, some of t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  instruments a r e  supplied 
by research organizations who may not be ab le ,  because of lack  of equipment 
or experience, t o  perform many of the a c t i v i t i e s  necessary f o r  meeting the  
mission objectives.  The respons ib i l i ty  f o r  performing such a c t i v i t i e s  w a s  
assumed by the Project  systems group which provided considerable support 
during t h e  design of the  s c i e n t i f i c  instruments as w e l l  as during the f a b r i -  
cat ion and t e s t  phases. For example, magnetic s p e c i a l i s t s  provided approved 
p a r t s  l i s t s  f o r  use by the experimenters and were ava i lab le  f o r  consultation. 
A magnetics laboratory was s e t  up i n  which parts f o r  the instruments were 
magnetically screened and t h e  magnetic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of each instrument 
were measured. Types of e lec t ronic  p a r t s  t h a t  were few i n  each instrument but  
common t o  most instruments were purchased i n  a l o t  t o  expedite del ivery and 
reduce cost .  With respect t o  r e l i a b i l i t y  and qua l i ty  control,  e s s e n t i a l l y  
the  same requirements were imposed on the  experimenters as on the  spacecraft  
contractor .  Generally these requirements a r e  formulated with the  complex 
organization of the spacecraft  contractor i n  mind. R e l i a b i l i t y  and Quality 
Control personnel f rm  the Project  Office were ava i lab le  f o r  in te rpre t ing  
these requirements t o  s u i t  the individual experimenter. They were ava i lab le  
for consul ta t ion during the design phase and l a t e r  monitored the fabr ica t ion  
and t e s t  phases. 
FABRICATION 
While Pioneer was being fabricated,  a n  important a c t i v i t y  of the  systems 
group was again the assessment of the e f f e c t  of required subsystem design 
changes uncovered during fabr ica t ion  on the remaining subsystems. 
each engineering change t o  spacecraft subsystems was reviewed by a formal 
Change Control Board .  Personnel from the  systems group a t  TRW were members 
of t h i s  board s o  t h a t  the group would be aware of proposed changes, could 
examine t h e i r  e f fec t  on t h e  overa l l  system, and could disapprove them i f  
thought necessary. Another area of a c t i v i t y  for t h e  systems group was con- 
cerned with monitoring and assuring proper qua l i ty  control.  
A t  TRW, 
TEST PROGRAM 
The purpose of the t e s t  program i s  t o  determine system performance and 
t o  i d e n t i f y  problems. The program, therefore,  must be comprehensive and must 
be performed carefu l ly  and thoroughly. 
be grouped i n t o  four  types. In  the first type, environmental t e s t s ,  the  
equipment was subjected t o  vibrat ion,  accelerat ion,  shock, high and low 
temperatures, and vacuum. The second type, funct ional  tests, were e s s e n t i a l l y  
"go - no go" t e s t s  t o  ver i fy  t h a t  the equipment was operating and were performed 
a f t e r  each environmental t e s t .  I n  the t h i r d  type, performance t e s t s ,  de ta i led  
The various t e s t s  i n  the  program can 
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measurements were m d e  on a number of subsystems t o  determine i f  t h e i r  * 
performance had de ter iora ted  during the  ove ra l l  t e s t  program. 
were a l s o  made of t he  induced magnetic f i e l d s  of each subsystem individual ly  
and then of t h e  complete system. 
each s c i e n t i f i c  instrument was t e s t e d  with a spacecraf t  simulator before 
in t eg ra t ion  on the  spacecraft  t o  ver i fy  that i t  would be compatible w i t h  the 
spacecraf t .  
malfunctions. ) 
of each subsystem while it operated w i t h  a l l  other  subsystems on the space- 
c r a f t  and of the  complete system operating i n  conjunction with a Deep Space 
S t a t  ion. 
Measurements 
I n  t h e  four th  type, compat ibi l i ty  t e s t s ,  
(This simulator was a l s o  valuable f o r  trouble-shooting instrument 
I n  other  compatibi l i ty  tests, de t a i l ed  measurements were made 
The environmental, funct ional ,  and p e r f o m n c e  t e s t s  were performed on 
The assembly t e s t s  t h e  individual  assemblies and on the  in tegra ted  system. 
were completed i n  three t o  f i v e  weeks, excluding any t i m e  f o r  r epa i r ,  and 
the system t e s t s  were completed i n  about f i v e  and a half months. 
The environmental tes ts  were conducted a t  two l e v e l s  - a qua l i f i ca t ion  
l e v e l  and an acceptance leve l .  
qua l i f i ca t ion  tests were 50 'percent grea te r  than those expected i n  f l i g h t  and 
appl ied during t h e  acceptance t e s t s .  
tures and input-power voltages were covered i n  t h e  qua l i f i ca t ion  t e s t s  than i n  
the  acceptance tests. 
The mechanical loads appl ied during the  
I n  addi t ion,  a wider range of tempera- 
SYSTEMACTIIVITIES DURING TEST F"ASE 
The pr inc ipa l  a c t i v i t i e s  of t he  systems group during the  t e s t  phase were 
as follows: 
1. Monitoring t e s t s  
2. 
3. Reviewing f a i l u r e  repor t s  
4. 
Par t ic ipa t ing  i n  pos t - t e s t  c r i t i q u e s  and Test Review Board 
Par t ic ipa t ing  i n  the  Fa i lure  Review Board 
Previously, the  group had prepared t e s t  requirements and had approved plans 
and procedures for use during the  t e s t  t o  make c e r t a i n  that they conformed t o  
the  requirements. 
Monitoring the tests and pa r t i c ipa t ing  i n  c r i t i q u e s  served several  needs. 
The r e s u l t s  of systems t e s t s  may in'clicate: 
systems must be modified because of a lack  of compatibil i ty,  (b) t h a t  t h e  
system i s  incompatible with another system not a ,part of t h e  t e s t ,  or ( c )  t ha t  
the  specif ied tests do not adequately e s t a b l i s h  t h e  performance of t h e  system. 
Correcting def ic ienc ies  of t h i s  type i s  wi th in  t h e  purview of t he  systems 
group; d e t a i l  knowledge of t h e  tes t  r e s u l t s  i s  necessary t o  m k e  t h e  cor rec t  
deci s ion. 
(a) t h a t  one or more of the  sub- 
Within several  weeks a f t e r  a pos t - t e s t  c r i t i q u e ,  t he  Test Review Board 
evaluated the r e s u l t s  from any analyses or i nves t iga t ions  which had been 
undertaken because of anomalies during t h e  t e s t s .  
t i c ipa t ed  t o  make c e r t a i n  that there  were no items l e f t  unresolved, t h a t  t he  
equipment passed t h e  tests successfully,  and that if necesmry,  other  elements 
within the  'program would be informed of t h e  results of t h e  t e s t s .  
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The systems groups par- 
The f a i l u r e  of any assembly of t h e  spacecraf t  and instrument systems i n  
qua l i f i ca t ion  tes ts  or acceptance t e s t s  was reported formally t o  t h e  Pro jec t  
Office within 48 hours w i t h  a descr ipt ion of t he  f a i l u r e  and the cor rec t ive  
ac t ion  taken. Such r epor t s  a r e  invaluable i n  recording the  progress of t he  
t e s t s  and i n  de tec t ing  recurr ing problems or t rends  i n  f a i l u r e s .  
ea r ly  access  t o  information which eventually may r e s u l t  i n  s ign i f i can t  e f f e c t s  
on other subsystems. 
usefu l  i n  t h e  evaluation of t he  r e l i a b i l i t y  and q u a l i t y  of t he  f l i g h t  equip- 
ment. One i s  always wary about f ly ing  equipment that has f a i l e d  and has been 
repaired a number of times. 
They permit 
They a l s o  provide a h i s to ry  of each assembly which i s  
Pa r t i c ipa t ion  i n  t h e  Fa i lu re  Review Board was an extremely important 
Here the  f a i l u r e ,  i t s  cause, and t h e  cor- funct ion of t h e  systems groups. 
r ec t ive  ac t ion  taken were thoroughly evaluated. 
required the  cognizant engineer t o  be thorough i n  evaluating f a i l u r e s ;  it had 
t h e  r i g h t  t o  r e j e c t  an evaluation and request f u r t h e r  study. A case i n  point  
concerns the  fuses  i n  the  instrument power systems mentioned previously. It 
i l l u s t r a t e s  the  need f o r  r e j ec t ing  the obvious a t  times and performing a 
de ta i l ed  evaluation. Several  f a i l u r e s  during t h e  t e s t  program seemed t o  
subs tan t ia te  t he  f e a r s  of t he  experimenters that fuses  were unre l iab le .  
plausible  explanation could have been t h a t  t h e  f u s e  was merely performing i t s  
funct ion by preventing a momentary power overload and hence damage t o  t he  
remainder of t he  equipment. Nevertheless, t o  s a t i s f y  t h e  requirement of the 
Fa i lure  Review Board, a comprehensive examination of t h e  problem was undertaken. 
A t e s t  program was undertaken which eventually showed that the  f a i l u r e s  were 
caused by the techniques used i n  assemblying the  fuses  t o  the  fuse  block. 
block was then redesigned and new f l i g h t  connectors of the  modified dcsign were 
f ab r i ca t ed  and i n s t a l l e d  on the  spacecraft .  No f u r t h e r  f a i l u r e s  occurred. 
The Fa i lu re  Review Board 
A 
The 
GENERAL COMMENTS 
The a c t i v i t i e s  of the  systems groups of Pioneer covered a wide spectrum; 
ye t  a l l  these  a c t i v i t i e s  followed a few general  guidel ines .  
r e spons ib i l i t y ,  t h e  group must continually give a t t e n t i o n  t o  the  most minute 
de ta i l ;  t h e  spectacular i s  r a re .  Nothing should be l e f t  t o  chance or assumed. 
Many problems r e s u l t  from misunderstandings during o r a l  discussions; hence, 
d i r ec t ion  and information should be i n  wri t ing.  Meetings should have a wel l  
defined purpose, be formal, and be well  documented. All items requir ing 
a c t i o n  should be assigned t o  one person w i t h ,  where poss ib le ,  a date f o r  
completion. 
Within i t s  a rea  of 
FLIGHT EXPERIENCE 
To conclude the  paper, the  f l i g h t  experience f o r  Pioneer V I  and V I 1  w i l l  
b e  reviewed b r i e f l y .  
have been no failures t o  prevent achieving the  mission object ives .  
have occurred, however, on both spacecraft .  
developed i n  the  o r i en ta t ion  system. 
T ~ S  exhausted. The spacecraft  a t t i t u d e  was as required before that t i m e  and 
t h e  need f o r  any f 'urther adjustments is  not an t i c ipa t ed  a t  t h i s  time. 
concluded from a n  lnves t iga t ion  by TRW t h a t  t h e  sea t  of t he  regulator  valve 
must have been damaged by v ibra t ion  during powered f l i g h t .  
t o  t h e  s t ruc tu re  supporting the  valve t o  reduce the  v ibra t ion  loads on 
Pioneer V I I .  Results ind ica te  the  f a u l t  was cured. 
To date,  t h i s  experience has been l imi ted  because there  
Malfunctions 
On Pioneer V I ,  a slow leak  
A t  t he  end of s i x  months, the  gas supply 
It was 
Changes were made 
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On Pioneer V I I ,  t h e  p e r f o m n e e  of one of the  t r ave l ing  wave tubes 
deter iorated.  For ce r t a in  operating conditions, t he  cur ren t  and temperature 
became high and t h e  output power reduced. 
operating too close t o  i t s  point of i n s t a b i l i t y .  
tubes w i l l  be adjusted so as t o  operate f a r t h e r  from t h i s  po in t .  
t h e  Pioneer spacecraf t  have redundant t rave l ing  wave tubes.  
It i s  bel ieved that the  tube was 
On f u t u r e  Pioneers, t he  
Fortunately,  
S 
An anomly has a l s o  occurred with the o r i en ta t ion  subsystem which f o r -  
t una te ly  occurred a f t e r  t he  spacecraft  had been co r rec t ly  or iented.  Approxi- 
mately seven months a f t e r  launch, attempts t o  precess  the sp in  a x i s  by ground 
cormand were apparently unsuccessful; telemetry information indicated no 
operation of t he  nozzle valve. Three and one-half months the rea f t e r ,  a second 
a t t e m p t  was made t o  precess  the  sp in  a x i s .  In  t h i s  case, 2 / 3  of the system 
operated correct ly .  
change i n  a t t i t u d e  due t o  solar pressure.  The cause of t h e  anomaly i s  s t i l l  
under invest igat ion.  
t i o n  of t h e  s e n s i t i v i t y  of t h e  Sun sensors which cont ro l  t h e  maneuver due t o  
bombardment of high energy protons during s o l a r  f l a r e s  earlier t h i s  year.  
During t h e  second attempt,  which was p a r t i a l l y  successful ,  t he  i n t e n s i t y  of 
s o l a r  i l lumination a t  the  sensors was about 20 percent g rea t e r  than during 
the f i r s t  attempt because t h e  spacecraf t  was c loser  t o  the Sun. 
hypothesis is  cor rec t ,  i t  w i l l  be  necessary t o  reduce t h e  threshold of the 
sensors on f’uture Pioneers t o  prevent a r epe t i t i on .  
Both attempts were made so as t o  determine any Small 
We have speculated t h a t  a poss ib le  cause i s  a de ter iora-  
If t h i s  
The redundant rece ivers  and command decoders on each spacecraf t  have 
been used a l t e rna te ly .  This equipment operates  continuously; t he  rece iver  i s  
se lec ted  by the  frequency of t he  ground t ransmit ted s igna l  and t h e  decoder by 
the  command message. Other redundant equipment, such as that i n  the  d i g i t a l  
telemetry uni t  on both spacecraf t  and t h e  t r ave l ing  wave tube on Pioneer V I ,  
has not been used. 
t he  spacecraft .  
f lawlessly,  we do not take any a c t i o n  which might induce a malfunction. 
This equipment must be switched by sending, c o m n d s  t o  
So long as the equipment i n i t i a l l y  used continues t o  operate 
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